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Nontechnical Summary 
 
 
A main critique concerning the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of inclusion of emission reduction 
obligations for developing countries. A non-participation of major polluting countries located 
in the developing world in an ambitious international agreement on climate change 
represents an immense threat to our planet. This is due to the fact that some developing 
countries are meanwhile among the main greenhouse gas emitters of the world. China is 
already the second-largest CO2 emitter in the world and India is ranked fifth, for example.  
Due to the rising importance of developing countries’ contribution to climate change, their 
participation in an international problem-solution approach becomes crucial. Therefore, it is 
important to detect possible motivations for countries, both developing and industrialized 
countries, to participate in an international agreement on climate change. In order to analyze 
and depict aspects which raise the likelihood of countries signing such an agreement, we 
employ the game-theoretical concept of bimatrices. More precisely, we highlight the positive 
impact primary and ancillary or secondary benefits of climate policy may have on the 
outcome of international negotiations on climate change. Primary benefits are the benefits 
derived from pursuing climate policy’s primary aim, which is climate stabilization. In contrast, 
ancillary benefits are the monetized co-effects of climate policy, such as reductions in local 
air pollution. As we illustrate in a survey of the literature, ancillary effects are rather 
miscellaneous.  
In order to describe international negotiations on climate change we refer to the game of 
Chicken. Although the depiction in a bimatrix is a quite simple method, it discloses many 
important features of negotiation problems. Recently Schleich et al. (2006) employed a 
normal form game in order to analyse the behaviour of states in international climate policy. 
Endres and Ohl (2002) also employed bimatrices to analyze international environmental 
negotiations. As we do, they consider coordination games. The focus of their model is on the 
effects of different environmental instruments on the negotiation outcome. In contrast we do 
not distinguish between individual environmental instruments. We regard climate policy in 
general and not specific policies.  
Due to the fact that the properties of ancillary benefits differ significantly from those of 
primary benefits, interesting consequences result from this inclusion of ancillary benefits in 
the analysis. So this study identifies ancillary benefits of climate policy to provide important 
incentives for developing countries to attend an international agreement on climate change.   
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Abstract: Currently informal and formal international negotiations on climate change take 
place in an intensive way since the Kyoto Protocol expires already in 2012. A post-Kyoto 
regulation to combat global warming is not yet stipulated. Due to rapidly increasing 
greenhouse gas emission levels, industrialized countries urge major polluters from the 
developing world like China and India to participate in a future agreement. Whether these 
developing countries will do so, depends on the prevailing incentives to participate in 
international climate protection efforts. This paper identifies ancillary benefits of climate 
policy to provide important incentives to attend a new international protocol and to positively 
affect the likelihood of accomplishing a post-Kyoto agreement which includes commitments 
of developing countries.   
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I. Introduction 
 
A main critique concerning the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of inclusion of emission reduction 
obligations for developing countries. As Schelling (2002) points out: “There is no likelihood 
that China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, or Nigeria will fully participate in any greenhouse-gas 
regime for the next few decades.” A non-participation of these developing countries in an 
ambitious international climate policy represents a major threat to our planet. China is 
already the second-largest CO2 emitter in the world and India is ranked fifth. Energy-related 
CO2 emissions are forecasted to increase alone in non-OECD Asia from 3,626 million metric 
tons in 1990 to 15,984 million metric tons in 2030, while in Africa the rise in the same period 
of time is from 649 million metric tons to 1,733 million metric tons (EIA 2006: 73). While 
OECD countries emitted 13,150 million metric tons in 2003 and thus the main portion of 
global CO2 emissions, in 2030 the non-OECD countries will take the lead with 26,180 million 
metric tons of CO2 (EIA 2006: 73).1  
Consequently, due to the rising importance of developing countries’ contribution to climate 
change, their participation in an international problem-solution approach becomes crucial. 
This holds regardless of Schelling’s sceptical view mentioned above. Therefore, it is 
important to detect possible motivations for countries, both developing and industrialized 
countries, to participate in an international agreement on climate change. In order to analyze 
and depict aspects which raise the likelihood of countries signing such an agreement, we 
employ the game-theoretical concept of bimatrices. More precisely, we highlight the positive 
impact primary and ancillary or secondary benefits of climate policy may have on the 
outcome of international negotiations on climate change. Primary benefits are the benefits 
derived from pursuing climate policy’s primary aim, which is climate stabilization. In contrast, 
according to the IPCC (2001), ancillary benefits “are the monetized secondary, or side 
benefits of mitigation policies on problems such as reductions in local air pollution associated 
with the reduction of fossil fuels, and possibly indirect effects on congestion, land quality, 
employment, and fuel security.” In order to describe international negotiations on climate 
change we refer to the game of Chicken.  
Although the depiction in a bimatrix is a quite simple method, it discloses many important 
features of negotiation problems. Recently Schleich et al. (2006) employed a normal form 
game in order to analyse the behaviour of states in international climate policy. More 
precisely, they show that restricting banking in EU emission trading may essentially 
constitute a prisoner’s dilemma situation for EU member states. Endres and Ohl (2002) also 
employed bimatrices to analyze international environmental negotiations. As we do, they 
consider coordination games. Yet, they regard two different types of games: Chicken and 
                                                 
1 In 2003 the non-OECD countries emitted 11,878 million metric tons. In 2030 the OECD countries will be 
responsible for 17,496 million metric tons of CO2 emissions. 
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Stag-Hunt. The focus of their model is on the effects of different environmental instruments 
on the negotiation outcome. In contrast we do not distinguish between individual 
environmental instruments. We regard climate policy in general and not specific policies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II., we distinguish between 
primary and - in the scientific literature widely neglected - ancillary benefits of climate policy. 
The concept of ancillary benefits is explained and circumscribed. Section III. provides an 
extensive survey of the literature on ancillary benefits. In Section IV. we depict international 
negotiations on climate change in a game-theoretic setting, where – in a first step - we 
consider exclusively primary benefits of climate policy. We discuss the influence of these 
benefits derived from the mitigation of climate change on the outcome of the international 
negotiations. Thereafter, in a second step, we integrate ancillary benefits into the game-
theoretical setting. Due to the fact that the properties of ancillary benefits differ significantly 
from those of primary benefits, interesting consequences result from this integration of 
ancillary benefits. Finally, Section V. concludes.    
 
II. Primary and Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy  
 
Additional to the primary benefits, climate policy regularly generates so-called ancillary or 
secondary benefits. These are benefits which result from climate policy but not from the 
induced climate protection. They are important in magnitude. Cost benefit analysis for the 
climate change problem should ideally incorporate ancillary benefits of climate policy (see 
Plambeck, Hope and Anderson 1997: 82).  
Different climate policies have different effects and may initiate different individual actions 
reducing GHG concentrations. Consequently, although they all contribute to climate 
protection (and provide primary benefits), different policies imply different ancillary benefits.2 
In order to illustrate the heterogeneity of ancillary benefits, the control of the most important 
greenhouse gas CO2 is considered here.  
Climate policies which are intended to reduce CO2 concentrations initiate the sequestration 
of carbon by afforestation/reforestation and/or the reduction of CO2 emissions. Yet, 
afforestation and reforestation do not only mitigate CO2-induced global warming (and provide 
primary benefits) by sequestering carbon (C), these measures also increase the habitat for 
endangered species. Furthermore, forests can serve as recreational areas and reduce soil 
erosion. The conservation of tropical forests is of extraordinary importance since they house 
more than 50 per cent of global species of plants and animals (Sandler 1997: 91). 
Furthermore, Sandler and Sargent (1995: 160) point out that tropical forests provide a 
                                                 
2 So stricter environmental regulations may afford benefits also to firms e.g. through improved product design, 
innovation, corporate morale and in other ways (see e.g. Porter 1991 as well as Heyes and Liston-Heyes 1999). 
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bequest value which the current generation derives from passing the forests on to future 
generations. Fearnside (2001: 180) stresses concerning the case of Brazil: “The 
environmental and social impacts of mitigation options such as large hydropower projects, 
mega-plantations or nuclear energy, contrast with the ‘ancillary’ benefits of forest 
maintenance.” An overview of studies assessing the co-effects of afforestation is provided by 
Elbakidze and McCarl (2007: 565). 
Reduction of carbon dioxide emissions can be achieved by fuel combustion reductions, e.g. 
caused by the implementation of more efficient technologies or the reduction of road traffic, 
and the substitution of carbon-intensive fuels. Ancillary benefits induced by activities 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions accrue from the mitigation of non-CO2 emissions, for 
example (see Figure 1). In fuel combustion processes CO2 emissions are accompanied by 
emissions of, e.g., NOX, SO2, N2O and others. Therefore, fuel combustion reductions do not 
only cause a decrease in CO2 emissions but also diminish the emissions of other pollutants. 
In general positive health effects of air pollution reduction that accompany climate protection 
measures are considered to represent the most important category of secondary benefits.3 
Further negative impacts of air pollution like accelerated surface corrosion, weathering of 
materials and impaired visibility are mitigated by fuel combustion reductions, too. Road traffic 
mitigation does not only produce ancillary benefits by reducing the emission of air pollutants 
but it is also accompanied by lower noise levels and reduced frequency of accidents, less 
traffic congestion and less road surface damage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Climate Policy Generating Primary and Ancillary Benefits4 
                                                 
3 Aunan et al. (2003: 289) annotate that “some particulate air pollution has a cooling effect on the atmosphere, 
reducing it may exacerbate global warming.” 
4 See Rübbelke (2002: 36). 
Climate Policy     
(e.g. CO2-Tax) 
GHG Abatement Measures
Climate Protection           Reduction in Local Air Pollution  
 
 Primary Benefits               Ancillary Benefits 
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Mostly, ancillary benefits are local or regional (IPCC 1996: 217; Pearce 1992: 5). They 
represent domestic public goods for individual countries. Local air pollution mitigation 
generated by climate policy, for example, can be exclusively enjoyed by the protecting 
country. Therefore, we can regard ancillary effects to be private to the host country of a 
climate policy.  Consequently, they contrast to primary benefits which exhibit global 
publicness, i.e. no country can be excluded from enjoying primary benefits generated in any 
other country and there prevails non-rivalry concerning the consumption of the primary effect 
(climate stabilization) of climate policy.  
Beyond the geographical distinction or distinction of the degree of publicness, primary and 
ancillary benefits can be distinguished concerning the delay between implementation of a 
climate policy and occurrence of benefits and the required scientific knowledge to assess the 
level of benefits (Rübbelke 2002: 22-23).  
The intervals between the implementation of a GHG abatement measure and the occurrence 
of benefits differ significantly between primary and ancillary benefits. Primary benefits of 
GHG abatement arise with a delay of about 50 years. Secondary benefits on the other hand 
can largely be enjoyed almost immediately, since the avoided damages, e.g. from air 
pollution or noise, would have otherwise occurred instantly or shortly after the GHG emitting 
activity. Accordingly Ekins (1996b: 15) points out: “Unlike the benefits of reducing CO2 
emissions now in order to reduce damage from global warming in the future, reducing other 
emissions, which are causing damage now, yields benefits immediately.” If economists 
discount benefits with a positive rate, today's ancillary benefits get a higher weight compared 
with primary benefits in the distant future. The time lag between GHG abatement measures 
and the occurrence of primary benefits raises questions about the adequate discount rate. 
Both groups of benefits also differ concerning the required scientific knowledge to assess the 
level of benefits. A prerequisite for forecasting primary benefits is an immense knowledge of 
processes in regional spheres and the whole global system. Since especially knowledge 
about processes in the global context is incomplete, uncertainties affect the assessment of 
primary benefits which exceed the ones associated with the assessment of ancillary benefits. 
Boyd, Krutilla and Viscusi (1995: 22) point out: “Although assessing environmental damages 
is not an easy task, it would seem substantially easier than assessing the impact of global 
warming damages”.  
Of main importance in our subsequent analysis will be the distinction between both 
categories of benefits concerning their degree of publicness. 
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III. Survey of the Literature on Ancillary Benefits  
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, economists started to assess the damage cost of climate 
change. The early assessments found for the mainly considered region, i.e. the US, that the 
damage cost will not be much higher than 1 percent of GNP in a scenario where CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere double (see, e.g., Nordhaus 1991a,b; Cline 1992; 
Fankhauser 1992). Accordingly, the respective primary benefits of climate policy have been 
considered to be quite small. 
Soon several economists criticized the early climate-policy benefit analyses. So, Ayres and 
Walter (1991) complained that Nordhaus (1991a,b) had omitted a very important category of 
benefits in his assessments, which were the ancillary benefits. Due to this omission, a major 
part of benefits derived from climate policy has been ignored. 
The concern about the early climate-damage estimates has been shared by Pearce (1992), 
who demonstrated that the consideration of ancillary benefits would raise Nordhaus' highest 
marginal-damage estimate of US$ 66 per ton of carbon to over US$ 150 per ton of carbon.  
During recent years, many economists seized the suggestions made by Ayres, Walter and 
Pearce, and directed their attention to the analysis of ancillary benefits. Several of these 
studies found out that secondary benefits even represent a multiple of primary benefits, as 
Pearce (2000: 523) illustrates in an overview.  
 
Studies for Industrialized Countries 
Conceptual frameworks for ancillary benefits have been provided by e.g. Krupnick, Burtraw 
and Markandya (2000) as well as Rübbelke (2002). Rübbelke (2003) analyses ancillary 
benefits in an analytical impure public good model and elaborates how ancillary benefits 
affect the level of climate policy while taking account of the application of different 
environmental technologies.5 However, most studies on ancillary benefits are empirical ones 
and assess the levels of ancillary benefits. 
Several European studies assessing ancillary benefits find high levels of these benefits. The 
European studies at hand are heterogeneous from a methodological as well as from a 
geographical point of view. They regularly consider individual countries and do not analyse 
the impacts of GHG control on the whole EU.6 A couple of the early studies deal with 
Scandinavian countries.7 Glomsrød, Vennemo and Johnsen (1992) analyse in the framework 
                                                 
5 Impure public good models have recently been applied in environmental economics also by Kotchen (2005). 
Within the framework of this kind of model he investigated environmentally friendly consumption. 
6 Capros et al. (1999) analyse the ancillary effects in the EU which arise in the shape of the mitigation of air 
pollution. RIVM et al. (2000) also consider ancillary benefits in the EU. They take account of air pollution 
mitigation. Data which consider ancillary effects concerning road traffic are also employed in this analysis (see 
first method, page 63).  
7 A discussion of studies analyzing ancillary benefits occurring in Nordic countries as well as in the UK is provided 
by Bye, Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2003).   
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of a computable general equilibrium model for Norway a carbon tax-induced CO2-
stabilization. They focus on the ancillary benefits associated with an air pollution decrease as 
well as a transport activity reduction. Benefits generated by reductions in transport activity 
accrue from a decline in road damage, noise, traffic accidents and congestion. In contrast 
Alfsen, Brendemoen and Glomsrød (1992) develop a macroeconomic model for Norway and 
also consider ancillary benefits derived from the mitigation of air pollution and road traffic. 
Håkonsen and Mathiesen (1997) refer to the externality cost estimates provided by Alfsen, 
Brendemoen and Glomsrød (1992) in their general equilibrium analysis. A different approach 
is chosen by Alfsen, Birkelund and Aaserud (1995), who determine ancillary benefits by 
assessing the reductions in the abatement costs required to meet the Sofia Protocol and the 
Helsinki Protocol brought about by an EC carbon/energy tax. They have a wider 
geographical scope than most of the other European studies by considering nine western 
European countries. However, they only focus on reductions in CO2, SO2 and NOX 
emissions, and therefore omit ancillary benefits provided by the abatement of, e.g., other 
harmful pollutants like particulates or noise from traffic. Benefits associated with non-air-
pollution related road traffic effects are also omitted by the study by Van Vuuren et al. (2006) 
analysing the ancillary benefits which are due to the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. 
This study finds that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol yields substantial ancillary 
benefits in Europe stemming from air pollution mitigation. The assessment takes account of 
the mitigation of the air pollutants SO2, NOX, PM10 and VOCs. 
In contrast, Barker, Johnstone and O'Shea (1993) focus on measuring the importance of 
traffic-related benefits of a carbon/energy tax in the UK and omit the benefits of reduced air 
pollution. Barker, Johnstone and O'Shea (1993) show that although the traffic-related 
benefits (exclusive air pollution mitigation benefits) are assessed to be small in comparison 
to the ancillary benefits arising from less air pollution, they are not negligible. 
Ancillary benefits for the UK are also assessed by Markandya and Rübbelke (2004). Their 
study focuses on the secondary benefits of mitigated air pollution and takes account of 
alternative technologies generating ancillary benefits independently of climate policy. 
Some studies only analyse the physical impacts of climate policy on local and regional air 
pollution. Meyer et al. (1998, 1999) and Lutz (1998) simulate the effects of CO2 tax and 
permit schemes on emissions of non-CO2 pollutants for Germany, but do not translate these 
co-effects of climate policy into ancillary benefits. For their simulations they employ the 
econometric input-output model PANTA RHEI. The results show that there are important air 
quality improvements associated with CO2 control policies in Germany. Löschel and 
Rübbelke (2005) assess the impact of alternative environmental technologies on the level of 
ancillary effects of climate policy in the shape of SO2 emission reductions. Lutter and 
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Shogren (2001) show that the nature of ancillary benefits varies with the structure of the 
implemented climate policy.  
Ayres and Walter (1991) were among the first analysts who compared European ancillary 
benefit assessments with estimates for the USA.8 According to their results ancillary benefits 
in Germany are likely to exceed those in the USA. This may be due to the fact that the 
population density in Germany is higher than in the US. More recent estimates of ancillary 
benefits for 19 western European regions provided by Barker and Rosendahl (2000) also 
exceed the estimates found in studies for the USA, although the Barker/Rosendahl results 
are below the results found in earlier European studies. The view that population density 
matters for the importance of ancillary benefits is supported by Burtraw and Toman (1997: 
22, 2000a: 10, 15, 2000b: 23) as well as Burtraw et al. (2003: 668-669), who compare 
several European and US assessment studies of ancillary benefits. Concerning the 
European literature their main focus is on a survey by Ekins (1996a). An overview of studies 
is also provided by Davis, Krupnick and McGlynn (2000).  
Burtraw and Toman (1997: 21-22, 2000a: 15, 2000b: 23) as well as Burtraw et al. (2003: 
669) stress that the discrepancies between the high European assessments and the US data 
may also result from geographic differences. A greater proportion of sulphur emissions in the 
eastern US is deposited off-shore rather than on-shore as in Europe, for example. Apart from 
the demographic and geographic arguments, the discrepancies between the US and 
European ancillary benefits assessments are probably attributable to several other factors, 
e.g. the more aggregate level of modelling in the European studies (Burtraw et al. 2003: 668; 
Burtraw and Toman 2000b: 23), high economic valuations of environmental impacts 
employed by the European researchers (Burtraw and Toman 2000a: 15; Morgenstern 2000: 
7-8), and the application of a fixed coefficient procedure in European studies (e.g. Pearce 
1992; Barker 1993) contained in Ekins’ survey (Ekins 1996a). 
Among the first analyses of ancillary benefits for the US is the study by Scheraga and Leary 
(1993). They examine ancillary benefits of energy taxes stabilizing the US emissions of CO2. 
The analysis employs an intertemporal, general equilibrium model of the US economy and 
focused on health effects of the mitigation of several pollutants. It followed an assessment by 
Boyd, Krutilla and Viscusi (1995), which considered a different (and smaller) set of air 
pollutants than Scheraga and Leary (1993) did but took account of health as well as visibility 
effects of air quality improvement in the US. Another important study for the US is the one by 
Burtraw et al. (2003). The key pollutants they regard in their assessment are SO2 and NOX. 
As the overview by Pearce (2000: 523) shows, the analysis by Burtraw et al. (2003: 523) 
finds quite low ancillary benefit levels compared to other assessments. An overview of further 
US studies is provided by Burtraw et al. (2003: 666-667).      
                                                 
8 Barker (1993) also assesses ancillary benefits for the US as well as for European countries (UK and Norway). 
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Joh et al. (2001) investigate ancillary benefits in Korea. They consider the benefits 
associated with the mitigation of PM10 and SO2 effects were included in the assessment.  
 
Studies for Transition and Developing Countries 
Complainville and Martins (1994) consider emissions of CO2, SOX and NOX in a multi-
country, multi-sector, dynamic general equilibrium model (OECD GREEN). They find that air 
quality improvements may be as significant in developing countries as they are in 
industrialized countries.  
Morgenstern (2000: 7) points out that the limited literature on ancillary benefits in developing 
countries even suggests that these are considerably higher than in the US. Studies 
investigating regions outside industrialized countries are provided, e.g., by Wang and Smith 
(1999a,b), Aunan et al. (2000, 2003, 2007), Garbaccio, Ho and Jorgenson (2000) as well as 
Vennemo et al. (2006) who analyse ancillary benefits in China. Van Vuuren et al. (2003) find 
that large co-benefits of climate protection by means of energy efficiency improvement 
prevail in China. However, the analysis by Gielen and Changhong (2001) for Shanghai 
shows that the relevance of no-regret options is limited because of significant energy 
efficiency improvements in Shanghai in recent years. Yet, they admit that Shanghai seems 
not to be representative for the whole of China and that main GHG emission mitigation 
potential may be located in the rural areas of China.     
Dessus and O’Connor (2003) as well as Cifuentes et al. (2000) have a look at co-benefits of 
GHG control in Chile. An ancillary benefit analysis for India is provided by Bussolo and 
O’Connor (2001). Aaheim, Aunan and Seip (1997) as well as Aunan, Aaheim and Seip 
(2000) investigate ancillary benefits of energy saving in the eastern European transformation 
country Hungary. Markandya, Golub and Strukova (2003) provide an analysis of ancillary 
benefits in Russia. 
Sagar (2005) points out that climate policy may also contribute immense social-economic 
benefits to the world’s poor.  
O’Connor (2000) provides a comparison of different ancillary benefit studies for developing 
countries. Rübbelke (2006b) investigates the role international transfers from industrialized to 
developing countries may play in international climate policy. In doing so, he takes account of 
ancillary benefits.9 
The literature on ancillary benefits has grown immensely during recent years as can be 
observed from this survey. However, what is still largely lacking is the integration of ancillary 
benefits into the analysis of international negotiations on climate change. The only exception 
is a very specific model developed by Pittel and Rübbelke (2005). In the subsequent section 
                                                 
9 For the effects of ancillary benefits in an international environmental matching agreement, see Rübbelke 
(2006a). 
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we will provide a more general formulation of their model and will work out the implications of 
the integration of ancillary effects. 
 
IV. Negotiations on Climate Change 
 
IV.1 An Analysis Including Exclusively Primary Benefits  
 
 
Due to the public good properties of climate protection (non-rivalry in and non-excludability of 
consumption) there are free-rider incentives prevailing in international climate protection. 
Climate protection is the primary aim of climate policy and consequently, the derived benefits 
are called primary benefits of climate policy.  
The free-rider incentives result in a suboptimal low world-wide provision of climate protection. 
Since there is no global coercive authority which may enforce international regulations to 
overcome the associated inefficiencies, voluntary negotiations among countries are 
considered the only reasonable means to address the global warming threat. The negotiation 
situation concerning the provision of public goods is in a game-theoretical setting regularly 
described in the shape of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In such a game the dominant strategy 
of negotiators is not to agree on participation in an agreement on public good provision like 
the provision of climate protection. The situation can be illustrated by a bimatrix as the one 
depicted in Figure 2. It holds: >P PA AA C , >P PA AB D , >P PB BA B , >P PB BC D . 
In the respective game setting the governments of two states A and B decide on whether 
they participate or do not participate in an international agreement on public good provision. 
The letters in front of the comas represent the payoffs for country A and the numbers behind 
the comas are the payoffs for country B, given their strategies “participation” and “no 
participation”. As can be observed easily, each government will rigorously pursue the 
strategy “no participation” (or defection), regardless of the behaviour of its counterpart. 
 
B's strategy 
 
A's strategy 
no participation participation 
no participation ,P PA BA A  ,
P P
A BB B  
Participation ,P PA BC C  ,
P P
A BD D  
 
Figure 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
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Yet, the set-up of the prisoner dilemma game neglects an important aspect of international 
negotiations on climate change: the risk of a catastrophic outcome in case of mutual 
ignorance regarding the global warming threat and mutual defection. This risk can, however, 
be integrated by slightly changing the relation between the payoff given unilateral 
participation and the payoff given mutual defection: Countries’ payoffs associated with 
mutual defection are now considered to be lower than the payoffs associated with unilateral 
participation. Consequently, a defection strategy would not represent the dominant strategy. 
Given this modified scenario, the behaviour of a decision-maker now depends on the 
opponents’ behaviour and the negotiation situation is characterised by a so-called Chicken 
game. The game, which belongs to the group of coordination games, deviates only slightly 
from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, but describes international negotiations on climate 
change more appropriately as already noted by Carraro and Siniscalco (1993). 
Consideration of the risk of a catastrophic outcome modifies the pay-offs of countries A and 
B such that <C CA AA C , >C CA AB D , <C CB BA B , >C CB BC D  (Figure 3). It is still assumed that the 
climate catastrophe can be best prevented jointly by all countries. However, if other countries 
do not cooperate in international climate protection efforts, unilateral action would be the best 
response, since only such unilateral action can prevent complete inactivity in the combat of 
climate change and, therefore, the consequences of a catastrophic global warming outcome. 
Yet, any government hopes that the other countries participate in international climate 
protection, so that they themselves may take an easy ride. Then, they could save the 
expenses for own climate protection efforts and are nevertheless – due to the other agents’ 
protection activities – saved from the climate change catastrophe.  
 
B's strategy 
 
A's strategy 
no participation participation  
no participation ,C CA BA A  ,
C C
A BB B  1-pA 
participation ,C CA BC C
 ,C CA BD D  pA 
 1-pB pB  
 
Figure 3: Chicken Game 
 
In the depicted coordination game there exist no dominant strategies. Nevertheless, multiple 
Nash equilibria prevail which are associated with pure and mixed strategies. The Nash 
equilibria given pure strategies yield the payoffs ( ,C CA BB B ) and ( ,
C C
A BC C ). Provided there are 
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uncertainties regarding the participation of other countries like the ones which prevailed for a 
long time concerning the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Russia, mixed strategies 
become relevant. In this case decision-makers estimate probabilities concerning the 
counterparts’ behaviour. Country A estimates the likelihood with which country B will 
participate (pB) or not participate (1- pB) – and vice versa for country B (pA and 1- pA).  
In order to determine the mixed strategies in the game in Figure 3, we have to calculate the 
likelihood pB* (resp. pA*) of participation by country B (country A), which makes the decision-
maker in A (decision-maker in B) indifferent between playing “participation” and “no 
participation”.  
Probability pB* is determined by calculating the level of pB, where the expected payoffs of 
both strategies of A (“participation” and “no participation”) coincide. This is the case if 
 
 − + = − +(1 *) * (1 *) *C C C CA B A B A B A BC p D p A p B p .    (1) 
 
The left-hand side represents A’s expected payoff from participation and the right-hand side 
reflects A’s expected payoff from defection. The mixed-strategy equilibrium requires: 
 
 
− −= + − 
1
* 1
C C
A A
B C C
A A
B Dp
C A
. (2) 
 
Given our assumptions about pay-offs this expression is always smaller than unity and the 
numerator and denominator of − −( ) /( )C C C CA A A AB D C A  are both positive. The term in the 
denominator of (2) gives the payoff increase country A receives when it decides to engage 
unilaterally in climate protection compared to its payoff in the case of mutual defection.  The 
term in the numerator reflects the increase in country A's payoff when it decides to defect 
although country B engages in climate protection.  
(2) shows that pB*  is the higher, the higher country A's gain from unilateral action is 
compared to its loss from participating in a bilateral agreement. Given a high relative gain 
from participation, country A would decide to participate in an agreement even if it is 
relatively likely that country B also participates.  
Analogously we get  
 
− −= + − 
1
* 1
C C
B B
A C C
B B
C Dp
B A
, (3) 
 
with the interpretation of (3) following the same lines as the interpretation of (2). 
If the decision-maker in A (in B) is not sure whether his counterpart participates or defects, 
then he should play “participation” provided he expects that B (A) participates with a 
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probability which is below pB*  (below pA*). Whether or not pA* is below or above pB* depends 
crucially on the type of countries considered and their respective pay-offs.  
Let us again focus on the case of negotiations between industrialized and developing 
countries.  Assume that country A is an industrialized country like Germany while country B 
is a developing country like China or India. The individual countries may also represent a 
group of countries, i.e. the whole group of industrialized countries or developing countries. It 
is regularly argued that climate change is in developing countries not as highly ranked on the 
political agenda as in industrialized countries, although by cost-benefit analyses negative 
consequences of climate change are especially forecasted for developing regions. Since the 
rank on the political agenda is crucial for decision-makers, the payoffs in the subsequent 
payoff matrices are set in a way that reflects the perception of the global warming threat in 
the political sphere of the respective countries.      
Consequently, the decision-makers’ perception of the level of the benefits from climate 
protection and not the level of the benefits themselves play the crucial role in our game-
theoretical description of international negotiations. Accordingly, the payoffs for industrialized 
countries in Figure 3 are supposed to be lower in the case of missing climate protection 
activities than for developing countries. In contrast, the payoffs for industrialized countries 
are assumed to be higher than in developing countries if at least one country participates in 
climate protection. On the one hand, by decision-makers in industrialized countries a lack of 
international climate protection would be more intensely perceived as threatening than by 
governments in developing countries. On the other hand, climate protection is more 
positively perceived by decision-makers in industrialized countries than by their counterparts 
in developing countries. Therefore we suppose regarding the numbers in Figure 3: <C CA BA A , 
>C CA BB C , >C CA BC B , >C CA BD D . 
In the Prisoner's dilemma game, this additional specification of the pay-off relation between 
industrialized and developing countries would have no effect on the outcome. In the Chicken 
game, however, it allows us to draw more concrete conclusions about the likelihood that 
countries do or do not participate.  
Using equation (2) and (3) we can derive the following condition on the likelihood of 
participation of country A and B: 
 > = <* , , *B Ap p  ⇔  − −> = <− −, ,
C C C C
B B A A
C C C C
B B A A
C D B D
B A C A
. (4) 
The ratios in the RHS expression of (4) are already known from (2) and (3). (4) shows that 
the likelihood with which countries participate depends crucially on their relative gains from 
participation. If, e.g., country B's relative gain is higher than country A's, it will participate in 
an agreement even if the probability of A to participate might be higher than its own.  
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Recall that we assumed that with respect to their respective perception industrialized 
countries (A), stand to lose more than developing countries (B) in the case of mutual 
defection compared to unilateral participation ( − > −C C C CA A B BC A B A ) , i.e. the denominator of 
the RHS term in (4) exceeds the denominator of the LHS term. With respect to the 
numerators, our assumptions allow for the numerator on the RHS to be larger, equal or 
smaller than the numerator on the LHS. Let us assume first that the losses from participating 
in a mutual agreement would be the same or less in industrialized compared to developing 
countries ( − ≤ −C C C CA A B BB D C D ), then >* *B Ap p  would hold. In this case the relative gain from 
participation of the industrialized countries would always exceed the relative gain of the 
developing countries. Consequently, participation of the developing country B in the climate 
change agreement would be less likely than the participation by the industrialized country A: 
The developing country will only cooperate as long as his supposed probability that the 
industrialized country participates does not exceed pA*.  
If − > −C C C CA A B BB D C D  holds, however, this might imply <* *B Ap p . In this case, the loss in 
payoff from a shift from unilateral defection to mutual cooperation in the industrialized country 
exceeds the respective loss in the developing country by so much that the relative gain from 
participation becomes lower in the industrialized than in the developing country. Whether or 
not this assumption is sensible or not, remains open to debate. Given our line of argument 
above, it would seem straightforward to assume that not only, − > −C C C CA A B BC A B A , but also 
− > −C C C CA A B BB D C D . Yet, whether these higher absolute gains also translate into higher 
relative gains, is hard to tell. 
The Stern Review (Stern 2007) and the 2007 IPCC Assessment Report (IPCC 2007) suggest 
that the consequences of climate change may have been underestimated in the past. The 
risk of possibly catastrophic outcomes may increase the estimated primary benefits of 
climate policy significantly. Application of such possible new insights to our depiction in 
Figure 3 would require modifications in the individual payoffs. The payoffs CAA  and 
C
BA  would 
decline if new scientific insights suggest that climate change will have worse consequences 
than expected before. All other payoffs would increase. Therefore, the denominator of 
− −( ) /( )C C C CA A A AB D C A  in (2) will increase which ceteris paribus induces an increase in *Bp  as 
a country loses more in the case of mutual defection. With respect to the numerator, it can 
increase or decrease, depending on whether CAB  or 
C
AD  increases more. The overall effect of 
a rise in the primary benefit estimate is, therefore, ambiguous and it is not clear whether it 
will cause the likelihood of participation in an international agreement on climate change to 
rise.  
A similar reasoning applies to country B.  
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IV.2 Integration of Ancillary Benefits into the Analysis  
 
Let us integrate secondary benefits (SA and SB) in our Chicken game setting next. We take 
account of the fact that ancillary benefits can be enjoyed exclusively by countries taking 
action in climate protection (see Figure 4). Please note also that the amount of ancillary 
benefits that arises is assumed to be independent of whether or not the other country 
participates in an agreement. This assumption seems straightforward as ancillary benefits 
arise solely locally and due to local policies.10  
 
B's strategy 
 
A's strategy 
no participation participation  
no participation ,C CA BA A  +,C CA B BB B S  1- pA 
participation + ,C CA A BC S C  + +,C CA A B BD S D S  pA 
 1-pB pB  
 
Figure 4: Chicken Game and Ancillary Benefits 
 
Analogously to the procedure in the previous section, we can now determine the mixed 
strategies in the presence of ancillary benefits. Equalization of expected pay-offs under 
participation and defection in country A gives a modified version of equation (1): 
 
 + − + + = − +( )(1 *) ( ) * (1 *) *C C C CA A B A A B A B A BC S p D S p A p B p  (5) 
 
from which we obtain:  
 − −= − − +* *
C C
A A A
B C C C C
A A A A
A C Sp
A B C D
. (6) 
Analogously we get  
 − −= − − +* *
C C
B B B
A C C C C
B B B B
A B Sp
A B C D
. (7) 
 
If the decision-maker in the industrialized country A (developing country B) is uncertain 
whether the other country plays cooperatively or not, then he should participate in the 
                                                 
10 Changes in ancillary benefits due to different climatic conditions are assumed to be negligible.  
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international agreement, provided he expects country B (A) to play cooperatively with a 
likelihood which is below pB** (below pA**). 
Comparing the results with the results obtained in Section IV.1, we find that the likelihood of 
participation of the individual countries in the international agreement rises. It holds that: 
 
 = + >+ − −* * * *
A
B B BC C C C
A A A A
Sp p p
B C A D
 (8) 
and  
 = + >+ − −* * * *
B
A A AC C C C
B B B B
Sp p p
B C A D
. (9) 
 
Therefore, if the decision-maker in A (in B) is uncertain about his counterpart’s behaviour, he 
should play cooperatively even if he would expect country B (country A) to participate with a 
likelihood exceeding pB* (exceeding pA*), as long as this likelihood does not exceed pB** 
(does not exceed pA**). 
Studies on ancillary benefits suggest that these benefits are higher in developing countries 
than in the industrialized world. Furthermore, while an intensifying focus in developing 
countries lies on local and regional environmental problems, the threat of climate change has 
no priority on the political agenda of these countries (Aunan et al. 2000). Therefore, not only 
cost-benefit analyses assign higher secondary benefits to developing regions but it is also 
reasonable to assume that these benefits play a more important role in the political 
perception of developing than of industrialized countries. As Gielen and Changhong (2001: 
258) point out for countries such as China: “In reality, however, the order of issues on the 
policy agenda is different. First the apparent local air pollution problems are tackled; next the 
more distant GHG problem is considered.” 
Halsnæs and Olhoff (2005: 2324) stress that “the inclusion of local benefits in developing 
countries in GHG emission reduction efforts will […] create stronger incentives for the 
countries to participate in international climate change policies.” If we take account of these 
coherences and assume that SA > SB, then the likelihood of cooperative behaviour of 
developing countries rises relatively to the likelihood of industrialized countries. 
 
V. Conclusions 
 
In 2012 the Kyoto Protocol expires and a new climate protection agreement integrating 
commitments of developing countries is desired by the leaders of the majority of 
industrialized countries. The developing world, in turn, prefers to abstain from such 
commitments. The coordination of these opposing interests of industrialized and developing 
countries are and will be subject to international negotiations on climate change. 
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This paper demonstrates in a game-theoretical setting that the inclusion of ancillary benefits 
into the reasoning of decision-makers can strongly affect the outcome of such international 
negotiations. These ancillary effects are inherent in climate policy itself, since climate policy 
always generates secondary effects. Ancillary benefits can in general exclusively be enjoyed 
by the climate protecting country or region and are, therefore, benefits which are private for 
the respective country or region. Therefore, they contrast sharply to the primary benefits, 
which are benefits derived from the climate protecting impact of climate policy and are public 
to all. Since assessment studies estimate that ancillary benefits are important in magnitude, it 
is reasonable to conclude that their privatizing effect on the utility derived from protecting the 
climate tends to be significant. Nevertheless, this category of benefits has not been taken 
into account in an adequate way yet. This can be especially observed from the neglect of 
secondary benefits in analytical investigations of international negotiations on climate 
change. So far, researchers mainly focused on the empirical investigation of the level of 
those benefits. The implications of this important category of benefits can, however, be far 
reaching.  
The integration of ancillary benefits does – on the one hand – raise the total benefits 
obtainable from a climate agreement. However, as our analysis of rising primary benefits – 
which are public to all countries –  shows, a growing benefit level as such will not necessarily 
increase the likelihood of participation in an international agreement. Yet, the specific 
characteristic of ancillary benefits which only arises in the case of participation, induces 
indeed a positive impact on the probability of attending an international climate protocol. 
Furthermore, as we illustrate, this effect is likely to be especially strong in the case of 
developing countries.  
However, the idea that private benefits provide incentives for developing countries to 
participate in international greenhouse gas abatement efforts is not new. One way of 
inducing such private benefits is to transfer technology or money from the industrialized to 
the developing world. Furthermore, issue linkage, i.e. the linkage of negotiations on a climate 
protection agreement with negotiations concerning club goods, may generate participation 
incentives. The option of attendance to a trade agreement, for example, can explicitly be 
made conditional on signing a climate protection protocol. Therefore, countries that 
participate in the international combat against global warming could also enjoy the merits of 
the club good “trade agreement”. Countries not participating in climate protection are 
excluded from the benefits that the trade agreement provides. Therefore, additional benefits 
of climate protection activities are generated by means of issue linkage or transfers and 
these benefits are private to the group of participants, while climate protection benefits 
represent a global public good. The privatizing effects of the additional benefits raise the 
attractiveness of participation in international environmental protection efforts and mitigate 
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incentives to take a free ride. However, such privatizing effects are already inherent in 
climate policy itself, since climate policy regularly generates ancillary benefits, which are in 
general exclusively enjoyed by the climate protecting country of region. Yet, this is regularly 
ignored.  
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